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Abstract
This paper develops a labour market model with on-the-job search, match-specific pro-
ductivity draws and an endogenous irreversible schooling decision. The choice of schooling
is modeled as an optimal stopping problem which gives rise to the equilibrium heterogeneity
of workers with respect to the formal education. The optimal schooling decision is charac-
terized by the reservation productivity of students which is a monotone function of time.
The reservation productivity of high ability students is increasing narrowing the range of
acceptable employers in the regular labour market. This mechanism generates a positive
sorting of more educated workers to more productive employers. The schooling density is
downward-sloping and the equilibrium wage distribution is right-skewed with a unique in-
terior mode. This means that the majority of workers earn wages in the middle range of
the earnings distribution. At the same time there is a small proportion of employees in the
beginning of their career with wages in the left tail of the earnings distribution and a small
proportion of high-skilled workers earning wages in the right tail of the distribution.
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1 Introduction
Schooling decisions are closely linked to the situation in the labour market. Moreover, after
graduating fewer workers stay with their first employer till retirement, rather most workers con-
tinue searching on-the-job and change employers in the hope of better payment. This possibility,
however, may be anticipated by students leading to a feedback effect on the optimal time to
stop studying. Thus the analysis of human capital accumulation will not be complete if the
model does not explicitly account for the possibility of changing jobs. Some initial attempts to
consider schooling as an optimal stopping problem with uncertain wage growth in the labour
market have already been undertaken in the recent literature1. However, these models consider
the decision of a single student, whereas the properties of the labour market are largely underin-
vestigated so far. This paper attempts to fill this gap and provides a coherent framework for the
analysis of the frictional labour market with endogenous schooling decisions under uncertainty,
heterogeneous employers and job-to-job transitions.
Since matching is random between workers and firms some workers exit the education system
earlier than others if they get an attractive job offer. Therefore, in the equilibrium workers are
heterogeneous with respect to the level of schooling and the labour market is characterized by
two-sided heterogeneity of workers and firms. Having investigated the equilibrium outcomes in
this economy I find that the model helps to explain the following two empirical observations:
• (1). The reservation productivity of high ability students is increasing over time reducing
the range of acceptable employer types. The opposite is true for low ability workers with
a decreasing reservation productivity. This mechanism generates a positive correlation
between worker and firm types and explains a positive sorting of more educated workers to
more productive jobs;
This result follows directly from the decision of students to quit education. In line with the
option approach to schooling, entering the labour market is associated with a positive present
value of wages and is an irreversible decision. On the other hand, there is a positive value from
waiting and postponing the entry. This value is attributed to the positive return from schooling
as a higher level of schooling is associated with a higher expected future income. To model
the labour income I follow a standard Mincer regression approach and assume that the wage is
increasing in the education of the worker and the productivity of the job. Then it is possible to
show that the optimal schooling decision is characterized by the reservation productivity rule
saying that students should accept any job with a productivity above the reservation threshold
and reject any other job. If the student never accepted any job offer and reached a maximum
level of schooling such as a PhD this student may pursue an academic career. I assume that high
ability workers expect to be productive in the academic market which includes positions in the
field of research and teaching. This means that their reservation productivity is increasing over
time narrowing the range of acceptable employers. In contrast, low ability workers are assumed
to be unproductive in academic jobs and so their reservation productivity is falling over time,
making them more likely to enter the regular labour market.
This mechanism implies a positive correlation between the skill level of the worker and the
productivity of the job. Moreover, this finding is strongly supported by the available empirical
1see Hogan and Walker (2007), Jacobs (2007) and Bilkic, Gries and Pilichowsky (2012)
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evidence. For example, Haskel et al. (2005) consider UK manufacturing firms and report that
more productive firms hire more skilled workers. Specifically, in their sample plants in the top
decile of the productivity distribution hired workers with, on average, around 1/3rd of a year of
extra schooling relative to plants in the bottom decile. Other empirical studies do not directly
observe productivity of the job but rather use proxy variables such as a firm size, capital intensity
and firm profits. In this respect, Arai (2003) finds that in Sweden a half of the positive correlation
between firm profits and wages is due to systematic sorting of workers across firms. Workers
with higher education and experience seem to be matched with high profit firms. Similar sorting
on observables is also reported in Idson and Feaster (1990) for the US. These authors find that
the firm size effect falls from 23% to only 7% when the selection of high skill workers to large
firms is controlled for. More recent studies reporting sorting of high skill workers to larger more
productive employers include Oi and Idson (1999), Troske (1999) and Abowd et. al. (2004).
• (2). The equilibrium wage distribution is pick-shaped and positively skewed with a unique
interior mode on the distribution support. Inexperienced unskilled workers form the left tail
of the distribution, whereas experienced high skilled workers are situated in the right tail of
the wage distribution. The middle range of the density is composed of the combination of
inexperienced high skill workers and experienced low skill workers.
There are two driving forces behind this result. On the one hand, the equilibrium schooling
density is downward-sloping, that is the proportion of students is decreasing with a higher level
of schooling. So there are less workers with a doctoral degree than those graduating from a
high school. On the other hand, workers do not stay with the same employer till retirement but
continue changing jobs in a search of better payment. Thus low productivity jobs are unstable
and often filled with young inexperienced workers in the beginning of their career. In contrast,
high productivity jobs are more stable and typically filled with more experienced older workers.
When calibrated to the US economy, the equilibrium wage density is pick-shaped with a
unique interior mode on the distribution support. It is also right-skewed in accordance with
the empirical evidence of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics presented in figure 1. The earnings
histogram reveals that the median of the distribution is lower than the average earnings ($43
thousands) and the distribution is positively skewed. These empirical fact is captured by the
theoretical model even though the underlying productivity distribution is flat and uniform.
Indeed the majority of workers in the economy have a low level of education. However these
workers change jobs and move up the productivity ladder, therefore most workers earn wages in
the middle range of the earnings distribution. At the same time there is a small proportion of
employees in the beginning of their career with wages in the left tail of the earnings distribution
and a small proportion of high-skilled workers earning wages in the right tail of the distribution.
To sum up, the long right tail of the schooling density is translated into the equilibrium earnings
density and therefore the model does not require unrealistically long right tails for the underlying
productivity distribution (see Mortensen (2003)).
Summarizing, this paper develops a new framework for the analysis of schooling choices and
labour market transitions. Moreover, the generated labour market with two-sided heterogeneity
of workers and firms can replicate a number of empirical facts providing a theoretical foundation
for the better understanding of empirical evidence. To the best of my knowledge there are no
other studies that can explain the same empirical observations within a unified framework.
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Figure 1: Annual earnings in the US. Source: Current Population Survey 2000
In addition, the model is suitable for the analysis of policy changes on schooling decisions.
In particular, it turns out that more intensive job-to-job transitions discourage workers from
acquiring education. This is intuitive, since more intensive on-the-job search is associated with
a higher wage growth and has a positive effect on the present value of employment. Thus the
possibility to stop studying and enter the labour market becomes more attractive to students,
which is reflected in the accelerated exit of students from the education system. This, however,
means that any policy intensifying voluntary job changes by workers will have a negative effect
on the average schooling duration. One example of such policy is a commuting subsidy which
is actively used in a number of European economies2. According to this policy commuting
costs may be deducted from the taxable income reducing the effective tax payment. In the
empirical search model Rupert et al. (2009) show that workers require monetary compensation
for longer commuting times. Specifically, they find that a salary increase of 28.5% is required to
compensate workers for one hour longer commuting per day. Similar results are also reported
by Ommeren et al. (2000), who find that the average willingness to pay for one hour commuting
per day is estimated to equal almost half of the hourly wage. Thus it can be expected that a
more generous commuting subsidy will reduce the cost of accepting distant jobs and increase the
intensity of job-to-job transitions in the economy. This paper shows that one potential adverse
effect of this policy is a lower attractivenes of education and a reduction of schooling duration.
Related literature on optimal schooling under uncertainty can be generally divided into two
research directions. First, Williams (1979) suggests to model education as a risky investment and
follows a portfolio approach. The focus of his paper is on the optimal allocation of time invested
in education over the life cycle of the worker. This paper proves the optimal separation between
allocations to education and investments in risky assets and justifies the separate treatments of
education and risky assets in labor economics and finance. The approach of Williams (1979) is
2For example, in Germany workers obtain a subsidy of 30 cents per km with a maximum payment of 4500
EUR per year. Denmark requires a minimum distance traveled of 12 kilometers and then grants an allowance of
15 cents. Luxembourg allows a standard deduction of 396 EUR for distances of less than 4 kilometers which rises
to a maximum of 2970 EUR.
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extended by Hanchane et al. (2006). In this paper the authors introduce a positive correlation
between the process of human capital accumulation and the value of education in the labour
market which can be interpreted as an ability bias. This correlation leads them to the conclusion
that a higher wage risk has a positive effect on the investment in human capital. This is in
contrast to the original finding of Williams (1979), Eaton and Rosen (1980) and even earlier by
Levhari and Weiss (1974) in a two-period model.
The second approach was originated by the contribution of Hogan and Walker (2007) who
were the first to apply the theory of real options to the human capital investment decision. The
main idea of this approach is to separate the two components of human capital: formal education
and experience. The formal education is then modeled as an irreversible decision so the study
by Hogan and Walker (2007) is most closely related to the present paper. However, there are
a number of significant deviations. First, this paper recognizes that job offers and therefore
the possibilities to enter the labour market are rare events, so the process of job arrivals is
modeled by means of a Poisson process. Second, there is a maximum duration of schooling in
the present study such as the doctoral degree. This modification is not only a realistic feature
of the education system, but it also generates the dynamics of the reservation productivity and
wage which is absent in the original study by Hogan and Walker (2007).
Next, the growth rate of income is not a constant in the present study, rather workers continue
searching on-the-job and the growth rate of their income is stochastic. Similar to the present
study Bilkic et al. (2012) also relax the assumption of a constant growth rate and assume that
the individual income dynamics is described by the geometric Brownian motion. As a result in
their model the entry threshold is necessarily increasing over time, that is, the student wants to
be compensated for the additional education period and costs by a higher entry-level income.
In the present study the reason for the dynamics of the entry threshold is principally different,
it is the remaining time to the maximum duration of schooling which makes students more/less
choosy over time depending on their productivity in the academic market (which is used as a
proxy for their ability).
Finally, the most important difference of the present study and the models of Hogan and
Walker (2007) and Bilkic et al. (2012) is a labour market perspective of the analysis rather than
a problem of a single agent. In this respect the paper can be viewed as an extension of a model
by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to the population of workers with heterogeneous skills. In the
field of search and matching theory the study which is closest to the present one is a recent paper
by Burdett et al. (2011). Human capital in their model takes the form of a general experience of
the worker and is accumulated over time (learning-by-doing). Similar to the present study their
model can replicate the hump-shaped distribution of wages with a ”fat” right tail. However,
skill heterogeneity is exogenous in their model, so they can not reproduce the positive sorting of
more educated workers to more productive jobs. Similar search models with learning-by-doing
include Bagger et. al (2011) and Yamaguchi (2010).
Other studies on the education choice under uncertainty include Altonji (1991), Groot and
Oosterbeek (1992) and Jacobs (2007). Altonji (1991) considers the risk for the student of not
being able to complete the education program, so his model can explain the endogenous drop-out
rate from the college. This realistic feature of the model is also included in the present study.
Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) analyze the effect of the unemployment risk for the optimal level
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of schooling. Their model can replicate the fact that unemployment is a decreasing function
of schooling. Finally Jacobs (2007) investigates the option for the young individual to start
education or postpone it to the later period of time. The focus of his paper is primarily on the
effect of taxation on schooling.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains notation and the general economic
environment. Section 3 presents the problem of optimal stopping and gives a full characterization
of the individual decision to enter the labour market. Section 4 describes the properties of the
labour market when workers are heterogeneous with respect to their schooling level. Section 5
incorporates the risk of unemployment which allows me to calibrate the model to the US labor
market. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. Time is continuous and at every
point in time n(0) new agents enter the education system forming a pool of students. Similarly ρ
is a permanent exit rate of all agents into non-participation, so the total measure of participating
agents in the economy is a constant. Students are ex-ante identical upon entry, the time horizon
is infinite and the discount rate is r. The flow cost of a student is denoted by y, reflecting the
costs of accommodation and tuition fees. At the same time the flow income of a student is
denoted by z. This can be a scholarship or a flow salary from a student job. Variable T reflects
the maximum duration of schooling. Students with a maximum level of schooling T enter the
academic market with an exogenous present value of income V (T ) = a/(r + ρ). The academic
market includes positions in research and teaching. This market is not explicitly modeled in the
paper but it has an impact on the decision to exit the education system. In the following I am
going to perform comparative statics with respect to a and analyze its impact on the students’
decision to stop studying. Thus differences in a can be intuitively interpreted as differences in
the in-born abilities of students. For example, high ability students would be more productive in
the academic job, which is associated with a higher value of a. In contrast, low ability students
will be relatively unproductive in the academic job, which is associated with a low value of a.
In the process of acquiring education students are randomly matched with firms and obtain
job offers at the Poisson arrival rate λ. If the job offer is accepted the student enters the pool
of employees with an acquired level of schooling. This is an irreversible decision. Let w be the
flow wage of the employee which is given by the extended Mincer wage regression of the form:
lnw = α+ βs+ x+ ε
where α is a constant term, β is the return to schooling, s is the acquired level of schooling, x
is a firm fixed effect and ε is the random luck component. The linear relationship between the
log-wage and the schooling level is supported on the empirical level, for example, Park (1994)
reports that the linear functional form provides a good fit to the data and Card (1999) concludes
that it is reasonable ”to assign an estimate of the years of completed education to each reported
education class and assume a linear functional form” (page 1808). From the perspective of
workers, there are two sources of wage uncertainty, on the one hand, firms are heterogeneous
6
and workers don’t know in advance the type of the employer they will be matched with, i.e. a
high or low realization of x. The firm fixed effect, for example, can be interpreted as a size of the
employer. There is strong empirical evidence that larger firms pay higher wages after controling
for the observed worker characteristics, see Oi and Idson (1999) and Troske (1999). On the
other hand, there is a random luck component ε reflecting the quality of the match between the
firm and the worker. To simplify the representation of the model, let p ≡ eα+x+ε denote the
match-specific productivity of the job. Thus the productivity can be high because the firm is
large and productive, i.e. a high realization of x, or because the worker is a good match for
the job, i.e. a high realization of ε. So the wage equation becomes: w = peβs reflecting the
fact that wages are increasing in the schooling level s and the match-specific productivity p.
Let F (p) denote the distribution of match-specific productivities p ∈ [0..p¯]. Workers learn the
realization of p upon the match with the employer and have to decide if they accept the job
or not. Employed workers continue searching on-the-job and are randomly matched with new
employers at rate λe.
Finally, in sections 3 and 4 the risk of becoming unemployed is not considered to simplify the
representation. Nevertheless, unemployment is included into the model in section 5 to make the
framework more realistic. This extended model is then calibrated to match parameters in the
US labour market, however it should be noted that the state of unemployment does not change
the qualitative predictions of the model.
3 Bellman equations and optimal stopping
This section considers the present values of students and workers in the economy. Let V (t)
denote the expected present value of future income of a student at time t, which means that
the accumulated level of schooling of this student is equal to t. Similarly, denote W (t, p) – the
expected present value of a worker employed in a job with a match-specific productivity p and
schooling t. The Bellman equation for V (t) is given by (for the derivation see Appendix I):
(r + ρ)V (t) = (z − y)(1− e−λ(T−t)) + λ
∫ p¯
0
max(W (t, p)− V (t), 0)dF (p) + V˙ (t) (3.1)
The first term in this equation denotes the present value of the net student income z−y over the
remaining period of time T−t. The second term is the option value of waiting and postponing the
entry into the labour market. Here the gain from waiting is twofold. On the one hand, students
can wait for more productive jobs in the future, and on the other hand, waiting directly leads to
a higher level of schooling. Both of these factors imply a higher expected future wage w = peβt.
Next denote k = r + ρ and let s be the moment of time when the student enters the labour
market. Therefore s is the acquired level of schooling which remains constant after the market
entry. Bellman equation for W (s, p) is given by:
kW (s, p) = peβs + λe
∫ p¯
0
max(W (s, x)−W (s, p), 0)dF (x)
= peβs + λe
∫ p¯
p
(1− F (x))W ′pdx (3.2)
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This equation shows that workers employed with a productivity p accept job offers from new
employers only if their productivity level exceeds p. Next, differentiate W (s, p) with respect to
p to obtain W ′p = e
βs/(k + λe(1 − F (p))). So the present value of employment is separable in
productivity and schooling: W (s, p) = Ω(p)eβs where the auxiliary variable Ω(p) is given by:
kΩ(p) = p+ λe
∫ p¯
p
(1− F (x))dx
k + λe(1− F (x))
(3.3)
Note that W (s, p) is increasing in both arguments. In addition, in the absence of on-the-
job search (when λe=0) variable W (s, p) is simplified to yield pe
βs/k. This means that the
transformed present value of employment is a steeper function of productivity in the absence of
on-the-job search. This is explained by the fact that the option value of waiting for better paid
jobs falls with a higher p. Further consider the decision of students to quit schooling, which is an
irreversible decision. Building upon the separation result from above insert W (s, p) = Ω(p)eβs
into the present value equation for V (t) and consider the simplified case z = y, which means that
the costs and expenses from schooling (tuition fees) are fully covered by the student scholarship:
kV (t)e−βt = λ
∫ p¯
0
max (Ω(p)− V (t)e−βt, 0)dF (p) + V˙ (t)e−βt
Denote φ(t) = V (t)e−βt, so that φ˙(t) = V˙ (t)e−βt−βφ(t). In addition, let pr(t) be the reservation
productivity of students which is defined as Ω(pr(t)) = φ(t). Intuitively, at the productivity pr(t)
the student is indifferent between accepting the job and obtaining the present value Ω(pr(t))e
βt
or rejecting the job and continuing education yielding the present value V (t). Bellman equation
for the auxiliary variable φ(t) reads as:
(k − β)φ(t) = λ
∫ p¯
pr(t)
(Ω(p)− φ(t))dF (p) + φ˙(t)
First, consider the case when the reservation productivity is constant over time so that φ˙(t) = 0
and Ω(pr) = φ. This is a special case which applies if and only if pr = pr(T ) where the end-point
productivity pr(T ) can be obtained from the present value expression in the academic market:
Ω(pr(T )) = φ(T ) = V (T )e
−βT . For job offers with p > pr(T ) students with a maximum level of
education T prefer to work in the regular labour market. On the contrary, if the market job offer
is p < pr(T ) these students pursue a career in research and teaching. Further observe that the
benchmark productivity pr indicates the fixed point in the dynamics of pr(t) and is implicitly
given by the following equation:
(k − β)Ω(pr) = λ
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (p))Ω′pdp ≡ Φ(pr) (3.4)
Let k > β, the transformed present value of employment Ω(pr) is increasing in pr in the range
[0..p¯], while Φ(pr) is decreasing since Φ
′(pr) = −λΩ
′(pr)(1−F (pr)) < 0. Moreover, it is also true
that Φ(p¯) = 0. This means that equation (3.4) defines a unique positive value pr if (k−β)Ω(0) <
Φ(0) which is equivalent to (k − β)λe < kλ. In the following assume that this condition is
satisfied. Also note that a higher return to schooling β shifts the left-hand side of equation
(3.4) downwards which has a positive effect on the benchmark productivity pr. Therefore the
8
duration of schooling is generally increased and students remain longer in the education system
if β is higher.
Next, recall that a denotes the fixed flow income in the academic market (which is a proxy
for student’s ability), so that V (T ) = a/k and Ω(pr(T )) = ae
−βT /k which yields the end-
point boundary pr(T ). This means that the optimal student reservation productivity pr(t) is
constant and coincides with pr if and only if the flow income in the academic market is equal
to ar ≡ kΩ(pr)e
βT . Otherwise pr(t) is given by the following first order nonlinear ordinary
differential equation3:
Ω′pp˙r(t) = (k − β)Ω(pr(t))− Φ(pr(t)) (3.5)
This equation is autonomous since the right-hand side does not explicitly depend upon the time
variable. The discretized form of the differential equation (3.5) is illustrated in figure 2. The
corresponding curve for p˙r(t) is cutting the 45-degree line at the stationary point pr. Therefore
if the end-point pr(T ) is situated above pr then the reservation productivity function pr(t) will
be increasing over time with a starting point pr(0) situated above pr. Otherwise it will be
decreasing, hence it follows that pr(t) is a monotone function of time. Solution of the differential
equation (3.5) is implicitly given by the following function:
∫ pr(t)
C
Ω′p(x)dx
(k − β)Ω(x)− Φ(x)
= t, t = 0..T (3.6)
where the constant term C = pr(0) can be found by inserting t = T . This is the initial condition
for the differential equation (3.5), hence the optimal student reservation productivity pr(t) can
be obtained for every t. Its properties are described in proposition 1.
pr(t+∆t) pr(t+∆t)
pr(t)pr(t)
pr(T )pr(T ) pr(0)pr(0) prpr
Figure 2: Dynamics of the student reservation productivity
3For a more detailed treatment of non-stationarity in search theory see Van den Berg (1990)
9
Proposition 1: The student reservation productivity pr(t) is increasing for every t < T and
pr < pr(t) < pr(T ) if a > ar = kΩ(pr)e
βT . Otherwise pr > pr(t) > pr(T ) and pr(t) is decreasing
for every t < T . The student reservation wage wr(t) = pr(t)e
βt is an increasing function of t if
p˙r(t) ≥ 0.
Proof : Appendix II.
As can be seen from proposition 1, the reservation productivity of high ability students
(a > ar) is increasing over time. This is because high ability students are sufficiently productive
in the academic market. When students enter the education system, future income V (T ) is
heavily discounted over the maximum schooling time T and is multiplied by the probability of
not entering the labour market. So the reservation productivity is low initially but than rises as
the valuable future perspective to enter the academic market comes nearer and becomes more
likely. This effect is reversed if the academic perspective is not attractive, i.e. a < ar, which
happens for students with low abilities. Further, consider the role of on-the-job search. In
particular, there is a question whether efficiency of on-the-job search can reverse dynamics of
the reservation productivity. Proposition 2 is summarizing the result.
Proposition 2: Let pr and p0 denote the benchmark productivities with and without on-
the-job search respectively. In addition, let ar = kΩ(pr, λe)e
βT and a0 = kΩ(p0, 0)e
βT be the
corresponding flow incomes in the academic market. Then p0 > pr but a0 < ar. This means
there exists an interval of flow values a ∈ (a0, ar) such that the reservation productivity of
students is decreasing in the economy with on-the-job search but it is increasing in the economy
without on-the-job search: p˙r(t) < 0, p˙0(t) > 0.
Proof : Appendix III.
Note that economy without on-the-job search can be characterized by considering the impli-
cations of a lower job-finding rate λe (with a corner case λe = 0). If λe falls there is a twofold
effect on the transformed present value of employment Ω(pr, λe). First, from equation (3.2) it
immediately follows that employed workers are worse off if the probability of finding a better
paid job is reduced. This is a negative effect. On the other hand, a lower job-finding rate λe
makes students more choosy, so the benchmark reservation productivity pr is increased. This
is due to the fact that the option of waiting for better paid jobs becomes more valuable as the
probability of meeting new employers on-the-job is reduced. Proposition 2 shows that the first
effect is dominating and a lower λe has a negative effect on Ω(pr, λe), so the benchmark value
a0 = kΩ(p0, 0)e
βT in the economy without on-the-job search is lower than ar. Intuitively, the
present value of income is higher in the economy with on-the-job search. Therefore, students
with abilities a in the range (a0, ar) are estimating their income in the academic market as ”rela-
tively low”, so their reservation productivity is falling over time in the economy with on-the-job
search. This is different when the option to search on-the-job is not available and their income
in the academic market is estimated as ”relatively high” compared to the regular market.
3.1 Special case: uniform productivity distribution
This section investigates the model with a uniform productivity distribution F (p) = p, p ∈
[0, 1] so the maximum match-specific productivity is normalized to 1. From the perspective of
students this distribution is associated with strong uncertainty about the future job as high and
low productivity jobs are equally likely to be drawn. With on-the-job search the benchmark
10
productivity pr is implicitly given by (see Appendix IV):
pr =
(
1−
λe(k − β)
λk
)[
1 +
k
λe
ln
k
k + λe(1− pr)
]
The benchmark threshold pr for entering the labour market is obtained at the intersection
between the upward-sloping curve (k − β)Ω(pr) and the downward-sloping curve Φ(pr). Recall
from the previous subsection that λe(k − β) < λk and therefore both multipliers in the above
equation are less than 1. So there exists a unique pr ∈ [0..1]. Next consider an economy
without on-the-job search. The transformed present value of employment is then linear in the
productivity of the job: Ω(p) = p/k and the option value of waiting is a quadratic function
Φ(p0) = 0.5λ(1− p0)
2/k. Therefore the benchmark productivity p0 is equal to the lower root of
the quadratic polynomial (k − β)p0 = 0.5λ(1− p0)
2:
p0 = 1−
k − β
λ
(√
1 +
2λ
k − β
− 1
)
< 1
Denote the second root of this polynomial by p1 > 1. Clearly, a higher return to schooling β
leads to higher benchmark reservation productivities pr and p0. This means that a higher β may
reverse dynamics of the reservation curves p0(t) and pr(t) from increasing to decreasing over
time. Intuitively, if the return to schooling is low a large fraction of students exits the education
system in the beginning of their studies (if the reservation productivity curve is positively sloped).
In this case a higher value of β may change the slope of the reservation curve and reduce the
proportion of students exiting the education system with a low level of schooling. Consequently,
a higher value of β leads to a higher average level of schooling in the population.
In the absence of on-the-job search the reservation function p0(t) is explicitly given by:
p0(t) =
p1(C0 − p0)− p0(C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
See appendix IV for the derivation. Note that this equation implies p0(0) = C0 so that in
accordance with proposition 1 p0(t) is an increasing function of time if C0 = p0(0) > p0 and
a decreasing function of time otherwise. Both reservation productivities pr(t) and p0(t) are
illustrated in figure 3. The model parameters are chosen to calibrate the full model to the
semi-annual data in the United States. The calibration is presented in details in section 5 and
the chosen parameters are: r = 0.025, ρ = 0.022, β = 0.037, λ = 0, 181 and λe = 0.341. In
addition, the maximum level of schooling T is set to 24 semesters of voluntary education (12
years), including high school, bachelor, master and doctoral degrees.
For the above parameter choices the benchmark reservation productivities are given by:
p0 = 0.72, pr = 0.47 with the corresponding benchmark abilities (wages in the academic market)
a0 = 1.76 and ar = 1.92. Let ∆a = ar−a0 = 0.16. The left panel of figure 3 presents reservation
productivity curves pr(t) and p0(t) for the three ability values: a = [ar−∆a, ar, ar+∆a]. First,
at every point in time the reservation productivity of students in the economy with on-the-job
search is lower compared to the economy without on-the-job search. This means that students
are less choosy about job offers if there is a possibility to quit jobs for better paid ones.
Second, in line with a theoretical prediction the reservation curve p0(t) is upward-sloping for
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Figure 3: Left panel: reservation productivities. Right panel: reservation wages
students with intermediate abilities a0 < a < ar while the curve pr(t) is downward-sloping in this
range. So these students become more choosy about job offers over time in the economy without
on-the-job search while the reverse applies in the economy with on-the-job search. Moreover,
the variation of reservation productivities with a is stronger in the economy with on-the-job
search. In fact the reservation productivity curves are steeper over time the higher the intensity
of on-the-job search λe. To see this consider the maximum level of schooling s = T with the
corresponding reservation productivity pr(T ). The change in pr(T ) given a higher terminal wage
a is given by:
k
∂pr(T )
∂a
= (k + λe(1− F (pr(T ))))e
−βT
Therefore, a higher on-the-job search intensity λe makes the terminal reservation productivity
pr(T ) more sensitive to changes in a. Moreover this initial effect is further reinforced by a lower
level of pr(T ). This higher variation in the terminal reservation productivity is then translated
into the whole curve pr(t) making it steeper over time. Finally, note that the reservation wage
wr(t) = pr(t)e
βt is not necessarily a monotone function of time. This is illustrated on the right
panel of figure 3. For a = a0 the reservation wage in the economy with on-the-job search has
an internal maximum at t = 14 semesters. This is explained by the fact that the reservation
productivity curve is flatter for low levels of schooling since the terminal wage in the academic
market is heavily discounted over the remaining period of time. So the positive effect of higher
schooling on the reservation wage is dominating. In contrast when the remaining schooling time
T − t is low the slope of pr(t) is changing faster so the negative effect of a lower reservation
productivity is dominating at high levels of schooling.
Finally, note that all of the above results are derived for the case when the exit from education
is considered to be an irreversible decision. Even though there is empirical support of this
assumption, in every dataset there is a small proportion of students returning to the education
system after a delay of more than one year. For example, Rowan-Kenyon (2007) considers high
school graduates from 1992 in the United States and follows their activities in the next 8 years.
12
The author finds that 68% of graduates have immediately enrolled in college without delay,
about 9% of graduates enrolled within the next year, 14% left the education system and never
returned. And about 9% of students returned to the education system after a delay of more
than 1 year. In a similar sample Johnson (2013) finds that 53% of high school graduates enrolled
directly in college, 30% stopped schooling and never returned to the education system, and only
17% of students continued studying after some delay. This evidence confirmes that among high
school graduates most students either continue their studies directly or start working and do
not return into the education system. So I keep the assumption of irreversibility till the end
of the paper. Nevertheless, appendix V presents an overview of the model where workers may
continue studying if their employment in the regular market was not successful. I find that
the reservation productivity is then adjusted to account for the possibility of losing the job and
continuing the education.
4 Aggregate variables
This section deals with the equilibrium distributions of schooling, productivities and wages.
Every student optimally exits the education system upon receiving a job offer with a productivity
p > pr(t), an event which happens at rate ρ+λ(1−F (pr(t))). As a result workers in the labour
market are endogenously heterogeneous with respect to the accomplished education level s. Let
n(s) denote the total measure of students with a schooling level s:
n˙(s) = −(ρ+ λ(1− F (pr(s))))n(s) (4.7)
where n(0) is the total inflow of students into the education system per unit time. From the
above differential equation, the total measure of students n(s) is given by:
lnn(s) = lnn(0)− ρs− λ
∫ s
0
(1− F (pr(t))dt
Denote g(s) – the probability density function of schooling types, so that g(s) = n(s)/n, where n
is a total measure of students in the economy: n =
∫ T
0 n(t)dt. From equation (4.7) it follows that
g(s) is a decreasing function of s, that is the proportion of students is decreasing with a higher
level of schooling. So there are less students pursuing a PhD degree than those graduating from
a high school. Further, let E(p|s) be the total measure of workers employed with a productivity
below or equal to p and a fixed schooling level s. Students n(s) enter the group E(p|s) at rate
λ(F (p) − F (pr(s))), which is their primary employment. In addition, employed workers may
retire at rate ρ or quit the job for a better paid one at rate λe(1− F (p)), this means:
E˙(p|s) = λ(F (p)− F (pr(s)))n(s)− (ρ+ λe(1− F (p)))E(p|s)
Let E(s) ≡ E(p¯|s) denote the total measure of employees with a schooling level s and E ≡∫ T
0 E(s)ds – the total employment in the labour market. In the stationary equilibrium the inflow
of workers into the group E(p|s) should be equal to the outflow of workers from this group, so
that E˙(p|s) = 0. This condition should also hold for the aggregate employment E˙ = 0, so that
ρE = λn
∫ T
0 (1 − F (pr(s)))g(s)ds, where the right-hand side is an average student job-finding
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rate multiplied by the total number of students n. Intuitively, a higher job arrival rate λ, a
higher number of students n, and a higher average job acceptance rate contribute to the higher
stock of employment E. Differentiating E(p|s) with respect to p yields the joint probability
density function q(p, s) = h(p|s) · k(s), where h(p|s) = [∂E(p|s)/∂p]/E(s) and k(s) = E(s)/E:
q(p, s) =
ρf(p)(ρ+ λe(1− F (pr(s))))
(ρ+ λe(1− F (p)))2(1− F (pr(s)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
h(p|s)
·
(1− F (pr(s)))g(s)∫ T
0 (1− F (pr(s)))g(s)ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
k(s)
(4.8)
The first multiplier in this equation h(p|s) is a productivity density function in the population of
workers with s years of schooling. To simplify the analysis consider a hypothetical case pr(s) = 0
∀s, which means that the support of the distribution remains unchanged in the equilibrium
[0, p¯]. The productivity density function is then given by ρf(p)(ρ + λe)/(ρ + λe(1 − F (p)))
2 in
the economy with on-the-job search and f(p) otherwise. On-the-job search allows workers to
climb a wage and productivity ladder, so in the equilibrium there are disproportionately less
workers employed at low productivities h(0) = ρf(0)/(ρ + λe) < f(0) and disproportionately
more workers employed at high productivities h(p¯) = f(p¯)(ρ+ λe)/ρ > f(p¯). Therefore, on-the-
job search has a positive primary effect on the average productivity of workers if the distribution
support remains unchanged. Next, consider a more general case when pr(s) > 0 and recall
from section 3 that the reservation productivity is higher in the economy without on-the-job
search. If workers anticipate a possibility to change jobs in the future the range of accepted
productivity values is enlarged. This is a negative secondary effect of on-the-job search on the
average productivity. To conclude this part, a more flexible labour market does not necessarily
lead to a higher average productivity for comparable workers (with the same schooling s).
Now compare groups of workers with different years of schooling. If the reservation produc-
tivity is increasing over time more educated workers reject a larger number of applications. So
the range of accepted productivities is narrowing with a higher level of schooling and the average
productivity is increasing. This means that more educated workers on average are employed in
more productive firms, so there is positive assortative matching on observable worker and firm
characteristics. This prediction is supported by the empirical evidence, for example Oi and Idson
(1999), Troske (1999) and Abowd et. al. (2004) report a positive sorting of high skill workers
into larger firms. Specifically, these studies show that larger more producive firms pay higher
wages. Moreover, this wage premium is reduced but not eliminated by the positive sorting of
workers. This means that sorting of more educated workers to larger firms explains a part of the
firm size premium, but it still exists after controlling for the observable worker characteristics.
The second multiplier k(s) in the equation for q(p, s) is an equilibrium density function of
schooling types in the population of workers. If the academic market is sufficiently attractive
and the reservation productivity pr(s) is increasing over time, then the student job acceptance
rate (1 − F (pr(s)) is above the average for low values of schooling and it is below the average
for higher levels of schooling. Consequently, there are disproportionately more employees with
low schooling than students (i.e k(0) > g(0) and k(T ) < g(T )). The opposite holds when the
reservation productivity is decreasing over time, in addition k(s) = g(s) ∀s if the reservation
productivity is constant.
Finally, an equilibrium distribution of earnings Q(w) can be obtained by integrating the joint
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density q(s, p) over productivity and schooling: Q(w) = P{peβs < w}. Note that individual
wages are increasing in schooling s and the match-specific productivity p. If in addition the
reservation productivity pr(t) is increasing over time then the lowest wage in the economy is
equal to pr(0). This wage is paid to unskilled workers with zero voluntary schooling employed
in jobs with a lowest productivity. In contrast, the highest wage in the economy is p¯eβT , which
is paid to workers with a highest level of schooling T employed in most productive jobs.
The equilibrium distribution of wages is then given by:
Q(w) =
{
Q1(w)/E if pr(0) < w < p¯
Q2(w)/E if p¯ < w < p¯e
βT
where Q1(w) =
∫ T
0
max[0, E(we−βs|s)]ds
and Q2(w) =
λn
ρ
∫ 1
β
ln(w
p¯
)
0
(1− F (pr(s)))g(s)ds+
∫ T
1
β
ln(w
p¯
)
max[0, E(we−βs|s)]ds
Function Q(w) satisfies the standard properties, since Q1(pr(0)) = 0, Q1(p¯) = Q2(p¯) and
Q2(p¯e
βT ) = 1. However, the earnings density is discontinuous at the point w = p¯. The fol-
lowing section shows that the point w = p¯ delivers an internal maximum of the equilibrium
earnings distribution, so the respective density function is pick-shaped with a unique internal
mode on the distribution support.
4.1 Special case: uniform productivity distribution
This section continues analysis of the labour market with a uniform productivity distribution.
For the special case when the reservation productivity is a constant, the schooling density coin-
cides with the truncated exponential distribution:
g(s) =
(ρ+ λ(1− F (pr)))e
−(ρ+λ(1−F (pr)))s
1− e−(ρ+λ(1−F (pr)))T
s = 0...T
Figure 4 illustrates probability density functions of schooling types in the pool of students. These
density functions are presented for the three respective ability values: a = [ar−∆a, ar, ar+∆a]
with and without on-the-job search. All density functions are decreasing which implies that the
proportion of students is decreasing in s. Let g0(s) denote the corresponding schooling density
in the economy without on-the-job search. For the case of the uniform productivity distribution
this function can be obtained explicitly as (see Appendix IV):
g0(s) =
n(0)
n(p1 − p0)2
[
C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)s
]2
e−(ρ+λ(1−p1))s
If the reservation productivity p0(t) is constant over time, it holds that C0 = p0, so the above
density function simplifies to yield g0(s) = n(0)e
−(ρ+λ(1−p0))s/n.
Next consider respective proportions of unskilled workers (g(0)) in both economies, which
can be obtained as g(0) = n(0)/n. If the entry of workers n(0) is the same, then differences in
the proportions of unskilled workers are solely attributed to differences in the total numbers of
students n. Therefore, comparing the numbers of students reveals the following:
n(0)
∫ T
0
e−(ρ+λ)s+λ
∫ s
0 F (pr(t))dtds < n(0)
∫ T
0
e−(ρ+λ)s+λ
∫ s
0 F (p0(t))dtds
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Figure 4: Probability density functions of schooling types g(s)
so the total number of students is lower in the economy with on-the-job search due to the lower
reservation productivity curve
∫ s
0 F (pr(t))dt <
∫ s
0 F (p0(t))dt. Consequently, the model predicts
that on-the-job search improves the outside opportunities of workers and unambiguously leads
to a lower number of students n and a higher proportion of unskilled workers g(0). In addition,
this finding implies that the schooling density function is steeper in the economy with on-the-
job search and the average level of schooling is lower. These predictions are confirmed in the
numerical example. For the benchmark case a = ar = 1.92 the total numbers of students are
given by 7.97n(0) and 11.73n(0) with and without on-the-job search respectively. Similarly, the
average levels of schooling are equal to 7.0 and 8.9 semesters in the two economies. These findings
have important policy implications. For example, if policy is designed in a away intensifying on-
the-job search, it may have an adverse effect on the number of students and the average schooling
duration. As mentioned in the introduction, one example of such policy is a commuting subsidy,
which is actively used in a number of European economies. A more generous commuting subsidy
may increase the intensity of job-to-job transitions as workers will be more likely to accept distant
jobs. In this situation the model predicts that the labour market will become more attractive
to students which will be associated with an accelerated exit of students from education.
Differences in students’ abilities reflected in the attractiveness of the academic market a are
also illustrated on figure 4. Here both models predict that more able students have higher reser-
vation productivities and are less likely to exit the education system. This leads to flattening of
the schooling density functions, so the average duration of schooling is unambiguously increasing
with the students’ ability a. For example, in the model without on-the-job search the average
schooling is raised to 9.2 semesters when a is increased to 2.08, while it falls down to only 8.6
semesters when a is reduced to 1.76.
Next consider the equilibrium productivity distributions h(p|s) conditional on the level of
schooling. These are illustrated in figure 5 where the chosen schooling levels are equal to s = 0
(the left panel) and s = 24 (the right panel). Note that the productivity distributions are
presented for relatively able students, i.e. a = ar + ∆a = 2.08. Without on-the-job search the
productivity density h(p|s) is reduced to f(p)/(1− F (pr(s))). This means that the equilibrium
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productivity function is uniform truncated at the point pr(s). For the chosen scenario this
reservation productivity is increasing over time, so the range of acceptable job offers is shrinking
with higher schooling. For example p0(0) = 0.75 for students with s = 0 and p0(T ) = 0.85 for
most educated students. The fact that the distribution support is narrowing implies a positive
correlation between productivity and schooling as more educated workers are sorted into more
productive jobs. In the economy without on-the-job search the correlation coefficient4 between
variables p and s is equal to 0.17.
Figure 5: Conditional productivity density functions h(p|s), a=2.08.
In the economy with a uniform distribution and on-the-job search the productivity density
function h(p|s) is increasing in p. This is because less (more) productive jobs are less (more)
stable in the equilibrium. For the above mentioned scenario, when a = 2.08, the lowest acceptable
productivity of unskilled workers is pr(0) = 0.50 while the lowest productivity of the most
educated workers is pr(T ) = 0.72. The correlation coefficient in the economy with on-the-job
search is also positive as more educated workers select themselves into more productive jobs,
nevertheless the correlation can be expected to be weaker as low productivity jobs are not long-
lasting and constitute only a small proportion of the overall employment. In accordance with
this reasoning the correlation coefficient5 between p and s in the economy with on-the-job search
is equal to 0.06.
The first part of this section explains a twofold effect of on-the-job search on the average
productivity of workers. First, there is a primary positive effect as changing jobs allows workers
to climb a productivity ladder. However, there is also a negative countereffect as students
initially accept jobs with lower productivity. In the numerical example it turns out that the
two effects are mutually neutralizing each other and the average productivity remains virtually
unchanged (0.88 vs. 0.91 for s = 0 and 0.92 vs. 0.93 for s = T ).
Figure 6 illustrates two joint probability density functions q(s, p) and q0(s, p) for the bench-
4The correlation coefficient is obtained as (µs = 8.44, µp = 0.89, σs = 6.33, σp = 0.07):
corr(p, s) =
cov(p, s)
σpσs
, where cov(p, s) =
∫ T
0
∫ 1
p0(s)
(s− µs)(p− µp)q(s, p)dpds
5The corresponding moments are: µs = 6.52, µp = 0.88, σs = 5.88 and σp = 0.11
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mark scenario a = ar = 1.92. The two bivariate density functions are given by:
q(s, p) =
ρf(p)(ρ+ λe(1− F (pr)))g(s)
(ρ+ λe(1− F (p)))2(1− F (pr))
and q0(s, p) =
f(p)g0(s)∫ T
0 (1− F (pr(s)))g0(s)ds
with and without on-the-job search respectively. For a given productivity p both density func-
tions are decreasing in s, which means that the proportion of employees with an above average
schooling is lower than the proportion of employees with a below average schooling.
Figure 6: Left panel: with on-the-job search. Right panel: without on-the-job search
The situation is different when the schooling level is fixed. The joint density q(s, p) is then
increasing with a higher productivity p in the model with on-the-job search but it remains
constant without it. A combination of these effects implies that low wages are paid to workers
with low productivity and low schooling. However, for the case with on-the-job search figure 6
shows that the proportion of such jobs is relatively low. Similarly, there is a small proportion of
workers employed at highest wages. Indeed, above average wages are paid to high-skilled workers
employed in most productive jobs. In contrast, most workers in the economy are employed at
moderate wages resulting from a combination of low schooling and reasonable match quality. In
fact the mode of the distribution in the economy with on-the-job search is a point p = p¯ = 1
and s = 0 with a corresponding wage w = p¯ = 1. This explains why the equilibrium earnings
distribution is pick-shaped with a unique interior mode on the distribution support (figure 7).
This shape of the distribution is well-known in the empirical literature (Neal and Rosen (2000)).
Figure 7 presents the equilibrium distributions of wages in two economies with and without
on-the-job search for the benchmark ability a = ar = 1.92. The corresponding minimum wages
are pr = 0.47 and p0(0) = 0.73, while the maximum wage is equal to p¯e
βT = 2.46. Due to the
decreasing schooling density both wage distributions are positively skewed in accordance with
the empirical findings. The effect of on-the-job search is largely revealed in the left tail of the
distribution. On the one hand, both the reservation productivity and the minimum wage are
lower in the economy with on-the-job search. Therefore, wages in the range [0.47, 0.73] are only
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paid in the economy with on-the-job search. On the other hand, moderately paid jobs in the
range [0.77, 0.97] are more frequent in the economy without on-the-job search. This is explained
by the inability of workers to change jobs in the hope of better payment. A combination of these
impacts is illustrated on the right panel of figure 7.
Figure 7: Left panel: probability density of w. Right panel: cumulative density of w
This figure shows that the equilibrium wage distribution without on-the-job search first-order
stochastically dominates the alternative distribution: Q(w) ≥ Q0(w) ∀w. This result is already
anticipated in the beginning of this section. Indeed, the average productivity of workers in the
two economies is principally unchanged but the average schooling level is lower when the labour
market is more flexible (8.9 vs. 7.0). These differences are translated into wages. In particular,
the average wage is 1.16 in the economy with on-the-job search and it is 1.24 in the alternative
economy. Therefore an early exit from the education system when the labour market is flexible
may be associated with a severe wage penalty in the future.
5 Extension and calibration
This section extends the model and includes an additional state of unemployment. This extended
model is then calibrated to match the standard values of the US labour market. In particular
the model is extended in the following way. At every point in time students may fail to proceed
to the next level in their education. The shock of exam failure arrives with a Poisson arrival
rate γ. As an outcome of this shock the student enters the pool of unemployed workers and
starts searching for a job. Intuitively, the γ-outflow of students from the education system is a
proxy for the involuntary dropouts. The flow value of leasure when unemployed is denoted by
b and the flow cost of active search is denoted by σ. Note that neither students nor employees
search for jobs as a primary daily activity and so the cost of their search is assumed to be zero.
Equation (3.1) is then modified as follows (for z = y):
kV (t) = λ
∫ p¯
0
max(W (t, p)− V (t), 0)dF (p)− γ(V (t)− U(t)) + V˙ (t)
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where U(t) is a present discounted value of unemployment with a schooling level t. The values
of employment W (s, p) and unemployment U(s) are given by the following Bellman equations:
kU(s) = b− σ + λu
∫ p¯
0
max(W (s, x)− U(s), 0)dF (x)
kW (s, p) = peβs + λe
∫ p¯
0
max(W (s, x)−W (s, p), 0)dF (x)− δ(W (s, p)− U(s))
where δ denotes the job destruction rate. Similar to the case of students let b = σ, this means
that the flow utility of students and unemployed workers is normalized to zero. Unemployed
workers follow the cutoff strategy such that W (s, pu) = U(s), which means that unemployed
workers with schooling s accept the job if the match-specific productivity is above pu and reject
the job otherwise. The reservation productivity pu is implicitly given by:
pu = (λu − λe)
∫ p¯
pu
(1− F (x))dx
k + δ + λe(1− F (x))
≥ 0 if λu ≥ λe
and is independent of the schooling achievement s. This equation is due to the seminal contribu-
tion by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and implies a positive relationship between the job-finding
rate λu and the reservation productivity of unemployed workers.
Next consider the flows of workers in and out of the unemployment. Let u(s) denote the
measure of unemployed workers with a schooling level s. The differential equations for u(s) and
n(s) are given by:
u˙(s) = γn(s) + δE(s)− λu(1− F (pu))u(s)− ρu(s) n˙(s) = −(ρ+ γ + λ(1− F (pr(s))))n(s)
where the first term γn(s) is an inflow of students unsuccessful in acquiring education, the
second term δE(s) is an inflow of workers losing jobs, while the last two terms together form an
outflow from unemployment into employment and out of the labour force. Appendix VI shows
that even with unemployment the reservation productivity of students pr(s) is a monotone
function of time. Fix some particular level of schooling s, then either pr(s) ≥ pu or pr(s) < pu.
Consider the former case, then the inflow of new hires from unemployment into E(p|s) is equal
to λu(F (p) − F (pu))u(s) for pu ≤ p ≤ pr(s) and there is an additional inflow of students
λ(F (p) − F (pr(s)))n(s) for pr(s) < p ≤ p¯. Therefore the total measure of workers employed in
jobs with a productivity below or equal to p and schooling s is given by:
E(p|s) =


λu(F (p)− F (pu))u(s)
ρ+ δ + λe(1− F (p))
if pu ≤ p ≤ pr(s)
λ(F (p)− F (pr(s)))n(s)
ρ+ δ + λe(1− F (p))
+
λu(F (p)− F (pu))u(s)
ρ+ δ + λe(1− F (p))
if pr(s) < p ≤ p¯
where the outflow in the denominator (ρ + δ + λe(1 − F (p)))E(p|s) includes workers exiting
the labour market, losing jobs or quiting voluntarily for more productive matches. Finally the
joint probability density q(s, p) can be found as [∂E(p|s)/∂p]/E, this derivation is presented in
appendix VI. In the next section the model is calibrated to match the labour market in the US.
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5.1 Calibration to the US labour market
Consider the model with unemployment and on-the-job search from the previous subsection. To
match this model to the labour market indicators in the US let one period of time to be half
a year (one semester). In addition let the maximum duration of schooling be equal to 12 years
(T=24 semesters). This period includes the possibility to obtain a high school, bachelor, master
and doctoral degrees. Further the annual interest rate is chosen to be 5% which means that
r = 0.025. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2013), the total employment
in May 2012 amounted to 130 million employees including 1 million high-school teachers, 1.5
million college teachers and 1.1 million scientists. So the total number of employees in research
and teaching is equal to l = 3.6 million. In the steady state the inflow of workers into research
and teaching n(T ) should be equal to the outflow ρl. To match parameters I consider the model
with a constant reservation productivity of students pr, the hazard rate in education is then given
by h ≡ ρ+γ+λ(1−F (pr)), so the total number of high-skill workers becomes n(T ) = n(0)·e
−hT .
This yields the first calibration equation between parameters ρ, n(0) and h.
The total population in the model consists of employed and unemployed workers as well as
students, where the total number of students is n(0)·(1−e−hT )/h. Targetting the unemployment
rate of 6% which is a long-term average for the US gives rise to 8.3 = (130 · 0.06)/(1 − 0.06)
million unemployed individuals. Then the total population size can be written as L = 138.3 +
n(0) · (1 − e−hT )/h. Keeping the overall population at constant yields n(0) = ρL which is a
second calibration equation between parameters ρ, n(0) and h. Next, according to the report of
the National Center for Education Statistics (2011) the total number of high-school students in
the US is about 16.4 million. In the model this number can be generated as n(0) · (1− e−8h)/h
since the high-school duration is 4 years (8 months). This gives the third calibration equation:
n(0)e−24h = 3.6ρ n(0)(1− e−8h)/h = 16.4 n(0) = ρ(138.3 + n(0) · (1− e−24h)/h)
There is a unique solution vector to these equations {n(0) = 3.614, ρ = 0.022, h = 0.158}.
This implies that the total number of students in the model is 22.3 million, while the total
population is 160.6 million including 126.4 million employees in the regular labour market, 3.6
million workers in teaching and research, 8.3 million unemployed individuals and 22.3 million
students. Moreover, the dropout rate γ can now be expressed as γ = h − ρ − λ(1 − F (pr)) =
0.136− λ(1− F (pr)), where both variables λ and pr will be defined later in this section.
Following Jolivet et al. (2006) I set the annual job-finding rate of unemployed workers to 1.71
and the annual job destruction rate to 0.055, which means λu = 0.86 and δ = 0.0275. Moreover,
I choose the annual return to schooling to be 7.5% so that β = 0.0375 which is exactly in the
middle of the range [5%..10%] suggested by Card (2001). Further, unemployment is stationary
if γn + δE = (ρ + λu(1 − F (pu)))u , where E = 126.4 is the total employment in the regular
market and δE is a flow of workers losing jobs per unit of time. With a uniform productivity
distribution F (x) = x, x ∈ [0..1] this implies:
λu(1− pu)u = γn+ δE − ρu where γ = h− ρ− λ(1− pr) (5.9)
Further assuming as before that the value of leasure is equal to the cost of active search (b = σ)
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the reservation cutoffs of unemployed workers and students can be expressed as:
pu =
(
1−
λe
λu
)
kΩ(pu) pr =
(
1−
λe(k + γ − β)
λk
)
kΩ(pr) + γU
λe
λ
(5.10)
To avoid mass points in the earnings distribution λ is chosen so that pu = pr. Solving equations
(5.9), (5.10) and pu = pr produces the following values of the parameters γ = 0.034, λe = 0.341,
λ = 0.181 as well as pr = pu = 0.434 (see table 1). These parameter choices imply λu > λe > λ.
This ordering is intuitive as searching for jobs is the primary activity of the unemployed compared
to students and employees. At the same time, in reality employed workers are more experienced
and have larger social networks than students so the rate of job arrivals to students is the lowest.
In addition, note that the ρ+ λu(1− pu) = 0.51 so the average unemployment duration is equal
to 1 year. As a robustness check I compare the average salary of workers involed in teaching
and research with the average wage in the economy. In the real data (BLS 2013, annual wages
in thousands) this ratio is equal to $67.60/$45.79 = 1.5 whereas in the model this ratio is
ar/w¯ = 1.77/1.09 = 1.6, where ar = 1.77 corresponds to the stationary reservation productivity
of students in the extended model with unemployment. This comparison reveals similarity of
the observed ratio in the data with the one implied by the model.
Parameter Value Explanation
r 0.025 Annual interest rate 5%
ρ 0.022 Constant population size (ρ = n(0)/L)
γ 0.034 Proportion of teachers and researchers 2.2% (BLS 2013)
β 0.037 Net annual return to schooling 7.5% (Card (2001))
λu 0.860 Annual job-finding rate 1.710 (Jolivet et al. (2006))
δ 0.027 Annual job-destruction rate 0.055 (Jolivet et al. (2006))
λe 0.341 Unemployment rate 6%
λ 0.181 Target equal cut-off values pr = pu
Table 1: Parameter choices
The final wage density and the cdf in the labour market with endogenous schooling, on-the-
job search and unemployment are illustrated in figure 8. In addition, some selected statistics
of this distribution are presented in table 2. The skewness6 of the distribution is equal to 1.49,
so the density function is skewed to the right. Also the median value (1.04) is lower than the
average (1.09) which means that more than 50% of the employees are employed at wages below
the average. Note that the unimodal shape of the distribution with a positive skewness is purely
attributed to the endogenous factors of the model since the underlying uniform productivity
distribution is symmetric. On the one hand the schooling density is downward-slopping as less
and less workers achieve the higher levels of schooling and on the other hand at every level
of schooling workers are moving upwards to more productive jobs. To see this consider two
simplifications of the model. First, let jobs be homogeneous with a unique productivity value p
which eliminates the gain from searching on-the-job. The pdf of the wage distribution is then:
q(w) =
g( 1β ln(
w
p ))
βw
=
(ρ+ γ + λ)(w/p)−(ρ+γ+λ)/β
βw(1− e−(ρ+γ+λ)T )
6The skewness is derived as (µw = 1.085, σw = 0.297):
∫ eβT
pr
(
w − µw
σw
)3
dQ(w)
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which is a strictly decreasing function of w. The first reason for the negative slope here is a
decreasing density of the schooling distribution g(s) and the second reason is that the wage is a
convex function of schooling w = peβs for a fixed productivity p.
Figure 8: Left panel: probability density of w. Right panel: cumulative density of w
Minimum Median Mean Maximum Std. dev. Skewness
0.434 1.039 1.085 2.461 0.297 1.488
Table 2: Selected statistics
Second, let workers be homogeneous with a unique schooling level s. The wage density is:
q(w) = e−βsh(we−βs) =
ρe−βs(ρ+ λe(1− pu))
(1− pu)(ρ+ λe(1− we−βs))
and is a stricly increasing function of w since workers continue searching on-the-job. Thus
heterogeneous workers and jobs are necessary to replicate the picked shape of the observed
earnings distribution in the US (see figure 1). Finally note that the shape of the earnings
density is principally different from the underlying uniform productivity distribution and it is
the primary purpose of this paper to show that endogenous decisions of agents can generate
a realistic earnings distribution. Nevertheless, an even better statistical fit of the density can
be achieved by calibrating the model with a Pareto distribution of productivities suggested by
Mortensen (2003). This will amplify the skewness and the range of earnings values.
6 Conclusions
This paper develops a matching model of the labour market with on-the-job search, heteroge-
neous jobs and endogenous schooling. Exit of students from the education system is modeled as
an irreversible decision under uncertainty. This decision is fully characterised by the reservation
productivity which is a monotone function of time. The reservation productivity is increasing
over time in the case of high ability students. Intuitively, this means that high ability students
become more choosy as their schooling level is increasing and accept a smaller range of employ-
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ers. In the equilibrium this implies a positive sorting of high skill workers into more productive
jobs. This finding is compatible with the empirical evidence if the productivity index in the
model is associated with a firm size. The model then implies that larger more productive firms
pay higher wages conditional on observed worker characteristics and employ a larger fraction of
high skill workers.
Since the choice of schooling is made on the individual basis, the model predicts that workers
are endogenously differentiated in the equilibrium with respect to the level of formal education.
The schooling density is decreasing, so the proportion of workers is declining with a higher
level of schooling. Intuitively, this means that there are less students pursuing a PhD degree
than those graduating from a high school. Moreover, the average schooling level is lower in
the economy with on-the-job search compared to the rigid labour market. This finding has
important policy implications. It means that any policy intensifying on-the-job search, such a
commuting subsidies, may have a negative indirect effect on the average schooling level in the
population.
Finally, this paper investigates the shape of the equilibrium earnings density with a uniform
productivity distribution. This functional choice guarantees that the shape of the equilibrium
earnings density is not driven by the underlying assumption on the distribution of job types. For
a given fixed level of schooling the model predicts that the earnings density is increasing. This
effect is purely attributed to the process of on-the-job search as employees continue searching
and change jobs in the search of better payment. Combined with an endogenous decreasing
density of schooling types the model can generate an equilibrium earnings distribution with a
long right tail and a unique mode on the distribution support. This means that the majority
of workers earn wages in the middle range of the earnings distribution. At the same time there
is a small proportion of employees in the beginning of their career with low wages and a small
proportion of high-skill workers earning wages in the right tail of the distribution. The positive
skewness of the earnings density is supported by empirical evidence.
7 Appendix
Appendix I. For simplicity consider first the case when ρ = 0 and let τ denote a spell of
time between the two consequent offers. This means that τ is exponentially distributed with an
intensity parameter λ. With a probability P{τ ≤ T − t} the next job offer will arrive before
the maximum education level T is reached. Let EτX(τ) denote the expected present value of
income of a student conditional on obtaining a job offer before T , so that:
V (t) = P{τ ≤ T − t}EτX(τ) + P{τ > T − t}V (T )e
−r(T−t)
=
∫ T−t
0
X(τ)λe−λτdτ + V (T )e−(r+λ)(T−t)
where V (T ) denotes the discounted present value of future income at time T .
X(τ) =
∫ t+τ
t
(z − c)e−r(x−t)dx+ Ep[max(W (t+ τ, p), V (t+ τ))
]
e−rτ
=
z − c
r
(1− e−rτ ) + Ep[max(W (t+ τ, p)− V (t+ τ), 0)]e
−rτ + V (t+ τ)e−rτ
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=
z − c
r
(1− e−rτ ) +
∫ p¯
0
max(W (t+ τ, p)− V (t+ τ), 0)dF (p)e−rτ + V (t+ τ)e−rτ
where W (s, p) denotes the discounted present value of income of a worker employed with a
productivity level p and the accumulated schooling time s.
V (t) = (z − c)
λ
r
∫ T−t
0
(1− e−rτ )e−λτdτ + V (T )e−(r+λ)(T−t)
+ λ
∫ T−t
0
[∫ p¯
0
max(W (t+ τ, p)− V (t+ τ), 0)dF (p) + V (t+ τ)
]
e−(r+λ)τdτ
V (t) =
(z − c)
r
(1− e−λ(T−t))−
(z − c)λ
r(r + λ)
(1− e−(r+λ)(T−t)) + V (T )e−(r+λ)(T−t)
+ λ
∫ T
t
[∫ p¯
0
max(W (x, p)− V (x), 0)dF (p) + V (x)
]
e−(r+λ)(x−t)dx
by substitution x = t+ τ and dx = dτ . Denote the last term in the above equation by A(t):
A(t) = V (t)−
(z − c)
r
(1− e−λ(T−t)) +
(z − c)λ
r(r + λ)
(1− e−(r+λ)(T−t))− V (T )e−(r+λ)(T−t)
Differentiate V (t) with respect to t:
V˙ (t) = −(z − c)
λ
r
e−λ(T−t) + (z − c)
λ
r
e−(r+λ)(T−t) + V (T )(r + λ)e−(r+λ)(T−t)
− λ
∫ p¯
0
max(W (t, p)− V (t), 0)dF (p)− λV (t) + (r + λ)A(t)
= −(z − c)
λ
r
e−λ(T−t) + (z − c)
λ
r
e−(r+λ)(T−t) + V (T )(r + λ)e−(r+λ)(T−t)
− λ
∫ p¯
0
max(W (t, p)− V (t), 0)dF (p)− λV (t)− (r + λ)V (T )e−(r+λ)(T−t)
+ (r + λ)
[
V (t)−
(z − c)
r
(1− e−λ(T−t)) +
(z − c)λ
r(r + λ)
(1− e−(r+λ)(T−t))
]
= −(z − c)(1− e−λ(T−t)) + rV (t)− λ
∫ p¯
0
max(W (t, p)− V (t), 0)dF (p)
Finally, this equation should be augmented with a term ρV (t) when the exit rate ρ is positive.
Appendix II. First subtract equation (3.4) from (3.5) to obtain:
Ω′pp˙r(t) = (r + ρ− β)(Ω(pr(t))− Ω(pr))− (Φ(pr(t))− Φ(pr)) (7.11)
Consider the first case pr < pr(T ). This case applies if a > Ω(pr)(r + ρ)e
−βT . Since pr(t) is a
continuous function of time there exists a finite time spell ∆t > 0 such that pr < pr(T −∆t).
Then equation (7.11) implies that p˙r(T −∆t)) > 0 and therefore pr(T −∆t) < pr(T ), so that
pr(t) is increasing in the time spell [T − ∆t, T ]. Repeat this step by induction for time spells
[T − (n − 1)∆t, T − (n − 2)∆t] ... [T − 2∆t, T − ∆t], where 2 < n < T/∆t takes positive
integer values. Consider the last time spell [T − (n − 1)∆t, T − (n − 2)∆t] such that pr <
pr(T − (n − 1)∆t) < pr(T ). Next suppose that pr ≥ pr(T − n∆t). From equation (7.11) it
follows that p˙r(T − n∆t) ≤ 0 and therefore pr ≥ pr(T − n∆t) ≥ pr(T − (n − 1)∆t). This is a
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contradiction, so that pr(t) > pr ∀t =∈ [0..T ] and p˙r(t) > 0. In particular, from equation (3.6)
this implies that pr(0) = pr + c > pr, so that c > 0.
Similarly, for the opposite case pr > pr(T ) one obtains pr(t) < pr ∀t ∈ [0..T ] and p˙r(t) < 0,
so that pr(0) = pr + c < pr and c < 0. This case applies if a < Ω(pr)(r + ρ)e
−βT .
Appendix III: The benchmark productivity pr is obtained from (k − β)Ω(pr) = Φ(pr),
where variables Ω(pr) and Φ(pr) are given by:
kΩ(pr) = pr + λe
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))dx
k + λe(1− F (x))
Φ(pr) = λ
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))dx
k + λe(1− F (x))
kdΩ(pr, λe) =
kdpr
k + λe(1− F (pr))
+ kdλe
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))dx
(k + λe(1− F (x)))2
dΦ(pr, λe) =
−λ(1− F (pr))dpr
k + λe(1− F (pr))
− λdλe
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))2dx
(k + λe(1− F (x)))2
From (k − β)dΩ(pr, λe) = dΦ(pr, λe) one obtains an expression for dpr:
k − β + λ(1− F (pr))
k + λe(1− F (pr))
dpr = −dλe
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))(k − β + λ(1− F (x)))
(k + λe(1− F (x)))2
dx
Therefore, pr is increasing in λe. Next insert dpr into the equation for kdΩ(pr, λe):
dΩ(pr, λe) =
−dλe
k − β + λ(1− F (pr))
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))(k − β + λ(1− F (x)))
(k + λe(1− F (x)))2
dx
+ dλe
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))dx
(k + λe(1− F (x)))2
= dλe
∫ p¯
pr
(1− F (x))λ(F (x)− F (pr))dx
(k + λe(1− F (x)))2
So that Ω(pr, λe) is decreasing with a lower λe despite a higher value of pr.
Appendix IV:
kΩ(pr) = pr + λe
∫ 1
pr
(1− x)dx
k + λe(1− x)
= 1− k
∫ 1
pr
dx
k + λe(1− x)
= 1 +
k
λe
ln (k + λe(1− x))
∣∣∣1
pr
= 1 +
k
λe
ln
k
k + λe(1− pr)
Φ(pr) = λ
∫ 1
pr
1− x
k + λe(1− x)
dx =
λ
λe
[
1− pr +
k
λe
ln
k
k + λe(1− pr)
]
Without on-the-job search, the quadratic polynomial (k−β)x−0.5λ(1−x)2 can be decomposed
as −0.5λ(x− p1)(x− p0). Integrating and using partial fractions one gets:
∫ p0(t)
C0
dx
−0.5λ(x− p1)(x− p0)
=
−1
0.5λ(p1 − p0)
∫ p0(t)
C0
[ 1
x− p1
−
1
x− p0
]
dx
=
−1
0.5λ(p1 − p0)
ln
x− p1
x− p0
∣∣∣p0(t)
C0
=
−1
0.5λ(p1 − p0)
[
ln
p0(t)− p1
p0(t)− p0
− ln
C0 − p1
C0 − p0
]
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ln
p0(t)− p1
p0(t)− p0
− ln
C0 − p1
C0 − p0
= −0.5λ(p1 − p0)t
p0(t)
[
1−
(C0 − p1
C0 − p0
)
e−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
]
= p1 − p0
(C0 − p1
C0 − p0
)
e−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
p0(t) =
p1(C0 − p0)− p0(C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
∫ s
0
p0(t)dt =
∫ s
0
p1(C0 − p0)− p0(C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e−0.5λ(p1−p0)t
dt
=
2
λ
[
0.5p1λt+ ln(C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)t)
]∣∣∣s
0
=
2
λ
[
0.5p1λs+ ln(C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)s)− ln(p1 − p0)
]
lnn(s) = lnn(0)− (ρ+ λ)s+ λ
∫ s
0
p0(t)dt = lnn(0)− (ρ+ λ)s+ p1λs
+ 2 ln(C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)s)− 2 ln(p1 − p0)
n(s) =
n(0)
(p1 − p0)2
[
C0 − p0 − (C0 − p1)e
−0.5λ(p1−p0)s
]2
e−(ρ+λ(1−p1))s
Appendix V: This section relaxes the assumption of irreversibility when finishing education.
Suppose employed workers may lose the job at rate δ. However, rather than staying unemployed
they return back to the education system and continue studying. The present value equation of
workers is then given by:
kW (s, p) = peβs + λe
∫ p¯
p
(1− F (x))W ′pdx− δ(W (s, p)− V (s))
W (s, p) =
keβs
k + δ
[p
k
+
λe
k
∫ p¯
p
1− F (x)
k + δ + λe(1− F (x))
dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Ω˜(p)
]
+
δ
k + δ
V (s)
Note that Ω˜(p) is an extended function with δ in the denominator, moreover, Ω˜(p) is a decreasing
function of δ. Insert this expression into the present value equation for students:
kV (t) = λ
∫ p¯
0
max
[ keβt
k + δ
Ω˜(p) +
δ
k + δ
V (t)− V (t), 0
]
dF (p) + V˙ (t)
kV (t)e−βt =
λk
k + δ
∫ p¯
0
max [Ω˜(p)− V (t)e−βt, 0]dF (p) + V˙ (t)e−βt
Using notation φ(t) = V (t)e−βt yields the following:
(k − β)φ(t) =
λk
k + δ
∫ p¯
pr(t)
(Ω˜(p)− φ(t))dF (p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Φ˜(pr(t))
+φ˙(t)
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The reservation productivity is defined as Ω˜(pr(t)) = φ(t), so that:
Ω˜′(pr(t))p˙r(t) = (k − β)Ω˜(pr(t))− Φ˜(pr(t)) where Ω˜
′(pr(t)) =
k + δ
k(k + δ + λe(1− F (pr(t))))
Thus the reservation productivity pr(t) can be found from:
∫ pr(t)
C
Ω˜′(x)dx
(k − β)Ω˜(x)− Φ˜(x)
= t where Φ˜(pr(t)) =
λk
k + δ
∫ p¯
pr(t)
(1− F (p))Ω˜′(p)dp
With a uniform productivity distribution I get that:
kΩ˜(x) = 1 +
k + δ
λe
ln
k + δ
k + δ + λe(1− x)
Φ˜(x) =
λ
λe
[
1− x+
(k + δ)
λe
ln
k + δ
k + δ + λe(1− x)
]
Note that for δ = 0 both expressions simplify to yield Ω(x) and Φ(x). The end-point reserva-
tion productivity pr(T ) can be found as before from the indifference condition V (T ) = a/k =
Ω˜(pr(T ))e
βT . Then the change in pr(T ) associated with a higher value of δ can be found as:
0 =
∂Ω˜(pr(T ))
∂pr(T )
dpr(T ) +
∂Ω˜(pr(T ))
∂δ
dδ ⇒
∂pr(T )
∂δ
= −
∂Ω˜(pr(T ))/∂δ
∂Ω˜(pr(T ))/∂pr(T )
> 0
This proves that a higher risk of losing the job δ, makes graduating students less willing to
accept a job in the regular market, since the end-point reservation productivity pr(T ) is rising.
Intuitively, the present value of entering the regular market Ω(pr(T ))e
βT is decreasing with a
higher job destruction rate δ, thus students require a higher productivity of the job in order to
exit the education system. These effects are illustrated on figure 9 below.
Figure 9: Effects of higher job destruction rate δ when schooling exit is reversible
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Appendix VI
The present values of employment and unemployment can be expressed as:
kU(s) = λu
∫ p¯
pu
(1− F (x))W ′pdx kW (s, p) = pe
βs + λe
∫ p¯
p
(1− F (x))W ′pdx− δ(W (s, p)− U(s))
where W ′p = e
βs/(k + δ + λe(1 − F (p))) = e
βsΩ′(p). Multiply both sides of these equations by
e−βs and substitute U = U(s)e−βs to obtain:
kU = λu
∫ p¯
pu
(1− F (x))Ω′pdx kΩ(p) = p+ λe
∫ p¯
p
(1− F (x))Ω′pdx− δ(Ω(p)− U)
The reservation productivity of unemployed workers is given by U(s) = Ueβs = Ω(pu)e
βs =
W (s, pu) which implies U = Ω(pu). Inserting pu into Ω(p) produces:
kU = λu
∫ p¯
pu
(1− F (x))Ω′pdx = pu + λe
∫ p¯
pu
(1− F (x))Ω′pdx = kΩ(pu)
the present value equation for students is now modified as follows:
kV (t)e−βt = λ
∫ p¯
0
max[Ω(p)− V (t)e−βt, 0]dF (p) + V˙ (t)e−βt − γ(V (t)− U(t))e−βt
As before substitute V (t)e−βt = φ(t) = Ω(pr(t)) to obtain:
(k + γ − β)Ω(pr(t)) = λ
∫ p¯
pr(t)
(1− F (p))Ω′pdp+Ω
′
pp˙r(t) + γU = Φ(pr(t)) + Ω
′
pp˙r(t) + γU
The reservation productivity of students pr(t) is then given by:
∫ pr(t)
C
Ω′p(x)dx
(k + γ − β)Ω(x)− Φ(x)− γU
= t, t = 0..T
and satisfies the properties of proposition 1 where the stationary productivity pr is now obtained
from (k + γ − β)Ω(pr) = Φ(pr) + γU .
Fix the level of schooling s and consider the case pr(s) ≥ pu. The total employment of
workers with a schooling level s can be obtained as E(s) = E(p¯|s):
(δ + ρ)E(s) = λ(1− F (pr(s)))n(s) + λu(1− F (pu))u(s)
Insert the total measure of unemployed workers u(s) = [γn(s) + δE(s)]/[ρ + λuF¯ (pu)] where
F¯ (x) = 1− F (x) for the ease of exposition:
E(s) =
[(λF¯ (pr(s)) + γ)(ρ+ λuF¯ (pu))− ργ]
ρ(ρ+ δ + λuF¯ (pu))
n(s)
The total measure of workers with schooling s and productivity below or equal to p is given by:
E(p|s) =
λu(F (p)− F (pu))
ρ+ δ + λe(1− F (p))
·
γn(s) + δE(s)
ρ+ λu(1− F (pu))
if pu ≤ p ≤ pr(s)
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E(p|s) =
λ(F (p)− F (pr(s)))n(s)
ρ+ δ + λe(1− F (p))
+
λu(F (p)− F (pu))
ρ+ δ + λe(1− F (p))
·
γn(s) + δE(s)
ρ+ λu(1− F (pu))
if pr(s) ≤ p < p¯
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